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Abstract: Since 1950, trade has increased faster than product and has concentrated among de-
veloped countries and in manufactures. To explain these trade patterns, Markusen (1986) and
Bergstrand (1990) have developed general equilibrium models where income per capita levels play a
key role in the determination of trade. These models provide a theoretical formalization of Linder
(1961). Little work, however, has tested this theory quantitatively.
This paper introduces a model that builds from the previous literature. The main goal is to measure
how much of the increase in the volume and concentration of trade seen during the post World
War II period can be accounted for by considering preferences as a \non-trivial" determinant of
trade. This research represents the ¯rst attempt to quantify this feature using a calibrated general
equilibrium model.
We ¯nd that the introduction of nonhomothetic preferences, although consistent with the directional
changes in the data, cannot account for a signi¯cant part of the change in the level of trade.
How surprising is this? Not particularly, when we consider that the ratio of trade to product and the
concentration among developed countries were greater 100 years ago than today. If nonhomothetic
preferences were signi¯cantly driving the patterns of trade, trade should have been much lower and
less concentrated in the past. So, why was trade so high and concentrated during the last century?
And why has trade increased so fast since the 1950s? Many elements seem to be important for ex-
plaining these patterns. Among them, trade policy appears as especially signi¯cant. Low restrictions
during the nineteenth century { and in particular by the 1860s { may have played an important role
in the determination of the level of trade. Since the 1950s, the world has experienced a reduction in
manufacturing restrictions, mainly among developed nations, and an increase in regional trade, em-
phasized by the creation of the European Community. Our concern should then be, how important
has policy been for the evolution of trade levels? This question seems crucial and should receive
more attention.
(JEL classi¯cation:F12,F14,D58)
1I am very grateful to Tim Kehoe, Ed Prescott and the members of the Applied Theory Workshop at
the University of Minnesota for helpful comments. All errors are my own.
0Introduction
During the post World War II period, three main facts have characterized the evolu-
tion of international trade patterns. First, trade has increased faster than product; second,
trade has concentrated among developed countries; and third, the share of manufactures to
total trade has raised. (See Bergoeing 1996 and Deardor® 1984.) Some static facts become
also apparent from the data. In particular, since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution,
developed countries have tended to trade manufactures among themselves and to export
them to the rest of the world from where they have imported primaries2.
\Traditional theories" of trade, based on comparative advantage, explain trade as
the result of di®erences in relative autarky prices, either because of endowments - the
Heckscher-Ohlin model - or technologies - the Ricardian model. The more dissimilar these
are, the larger the volume of trade. Therefore, to explain the pattern of trade between the
United Kingdom and the rest of the world during the ¯rst half of the nineteenth century, or
to predict the pattern of trade for the newly incorporated nations of Eastern Europe during
the coming years, a Heckscher-Ohlin model may be appropriate. But, how do we explain
the fact that, consistently, more than two thirds of world trade occurred among industrial-
ized countries? World economic activity is mainly located in those countries and therefore
is not surprising that a high volume of trade occurs there, but their trade is proportionally
higher than their share in world production. How do we even explain the existence of this
trade? It is clear from the data that comparative advantages are not able to fully account
for the trade facts.
The \new theories"3 of trade introduce imperfect competition and explain trade by
assuming the existence of economies of scale and love for variety. A set of many varieties
of di®erentiated products are available for potential production and countries tend to spe-
cialize in the production of some of these varieties by exploiting economies of scale4 and
engage in trade in order to make all varieties available in each place. In these models, the
closer in terms of market size - as measured by GDP - two countries are, the more they
trade. In fact, trade between two countries is maximized when they are identical. This
model is typically used to explain the existence of trade in manufactures between developed
countries.
Therefore, the previous theories complement each other and together explain the
static structure of trade patterns; trade between developed and developing countries in pri-
maries and manufactures would be explained by the former, and trade among developed
countries in manufactures by the latter5.
An integrated model of trade is, therefore, able to explain the static characteristics
of trade, but what happens with its evolution over time? How well can we explain the
2Trade of manufactures for manufactures is typically referred as intra-industry trade and trade of man-
ufactures for primaries as inter-industry trade. For these facts, see again Bergoeing (1996).
3See Helpman and Krugman (1985) for a description of these type of models.
4The concept of increasing e±ciency by using division of labor introduced by Adam Smith in 1776 is the
base for this type of trade.
5A few models introduce the existence of exchange of commodities that belong to the same industry
- typically referred as intra-industry trade - within the structure of a Heckscher-Ohlin economy. See for
example Chipman (1992). Here, however, we will follow the more usual monopolistic competitive market
assumption to talk about product di®erentiation.
1dynamic facts observed since the end of World War II? As we will see next, there is no
evidence of the ability of this model to account for either the concentration in directions -
intra-developed countries trade - and composition - intra-industry trade - or for the increase
of trade as a fraction of income.
To explain the rise in trade among developed countries, the Heckscher-Ohlin struc-
ture would require an increase in their relative endowment di®erences, which does not seem
to have happened. (See Deardor® 1984.) The rise in two-way manufacturing trade is,
obviously, not explained either. The monopolistic competition model would require that
developed countries had became relatively more similar in terms of size, to explain the
concentration of trade among them. Evidence in this respect is not clear. Finally, because
of the more specialized nature of intra-industry trade, the concentration of trade among
developed countries would lead to the relative increase in the share of world trade in man-
ufactures, but as Leamer and Levinsohn (1995) say, the empirical studies that accompany
this theory have not been able to provide strong support.
With respect to the evolution of the ratio of trade to income, again, both models
have problems when accounting for the evidence. Their common assumption of identical
homothetic preferences imposes independence between consumption patterns - and there-
fore trade patterns - and income per capita levels6. Increases in the level of income per
capita shift proportionally the consumption of all goods and as a result neither directions
nor composition are a®ected. The share of consumption to income is not a®ected as well.
Furthermore, in the case of the Heckscher-Ohlin model, the assumption of constant returns
to scale and homothetic preferences imposes constant ratios of trade to income. Therefore,
two countries with di®erent sizes will trade identical fractions of their income7. Finally, in
the monopolistically competitive model, a convergence in the size of developed countries
would increase their share of world trade but, as we just said, with no response in the ratio
of trade to income due to changes in the level of income per capita.
Since the end of World War II, per capita income levels, as reported by Parente and
Prescott (1993), have increased as a result of the wealth distribution shifting up. Wealth
disparity has not changed however. The distance between the richest and poorest countries
has remained essentially the same. Changes in the level of incomes per capita may have
had, therefore, important e®ects on trade that are not being captured in a homothetic en-
vironment.
As we will see next, by introducing preferences as an explanation for trade, the
integrated model previously described becomes theoretically more consistent with the trade
facts, especially, with respect to the evolution of trade since the 1950s.
Linder (1961) considered preferences as a determinant for trade. He observed that
trade was being held mainly by industrialized countries and that it was concentrated in
manufactures. Linder's conjecture was that manufactures trade is the result of a domestic
market for that type of good. When production is established, producers will look for other
markets where to put their products and they will ¯nd them in countries where preferences
are similar. Then, he argued, since income per capita determines preferences, we would
expect that this type of trade would be mainly held between countries with similar income
6By assuming identical homothetic tastes across countries, the consumption side of the model is neutral-
ized. Trade, therefore, behaves similarly to production.
7This is another fact of trade that is at odds with this literature. See Arad and Hirsh (1981).
2per capita.
This seems to have been the case of England in the nineteenth century, also the
one of Japan where the invasion of textile markets was achieved with an industry that was
supported by a growing domestic demand for low-grade cotton cloth.
Linder did not formalize his theory, however. Since then, many models that are, at
least in part, consistent with Linder's conjecture have been created. Krugman (1979), Help-
man and Krugman (1985), Markusen (1986) and Bergstrand (1990) are some examples8.
The model in this paper is theoretically based on their work. It introduces preferences by
assuming nonhomotheticity in an economy where both comparative costs and division for
labor with taste for varieties explain trade. Such a model seems to move in the right direc-
tion when trying to account for the patterns of trade, especially for explaining the dynamic
facts. Trade as a fraction of income will increase as the economy grows and specialization
in high income elasticity goods - for example, manufactures - mainly traded by developed
countries, occurs. Therefore, given comparative advantages, trade concentrates among rich
economies, and its increase is mainly explained by the exchange of manufactures9.
Little work, however, has been done in order to provide quantitative support for the
importance of preferences in trade. In particular, these studies are typically characterized
by the estimation of a set of equations that is consistent with Linder's ideas. These equa-
tions are derived from gravity type models10. But, as Deardor® (1984) notes, their lack of
theoretical foundation weakens their conclusions.
This paper's main goal is to to quantify the e®ect of nonhomothetic preferences in
trade. We want to know how much of the increase in volumes and change in directions and
composition of trade can be accounted for by introducing preferences as a \non-trivial11"
determinant of trade in an otherwise standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Chamberlainian type of
model. We do so by calibrating a model to OECD trade data and then simulating the
evolution of endowments across regions since 1965.
As noted above, the assumption of nonhomothetic preferences in an otherwise stan-
dard general equilibrium Heckscher-Ohlin-Chamberlainian model of trade seems to have
some empirical support in accounting for the dynamic facts of trade in the post World War
II period. Speci¯cally, the increase in the ratio of trade to income and the rising concen-
tration of trade among developed countries and in manufactures seem consistent with a
nonhomothetic model.
The justi¯cation for a nonhomothetic environment has a basis in microeconomic
analysis as well. If preferences were homothetic, with individuals facing identical relative
commodity prices, the fraction of income spent in a particular commodity should be the
8See Bergoeing (1997) for a survey on this literature.
9We will consider manufactures trade as the exchange of di®erentiated products. As we will see later, as
intra-di®erentiated products trade increases relative to the trade with homogeneous goods, a larger fraction
of production is traded.
10See, for example, Bergstrand (1985)
11Preferences could be trivially introduced by neutralizing di®erences in technologies and endowments
and tautologically account for trade as a result of di®erences in tastes. Here, however, we will keep the
assumption of identical preferences across countries but we will introduce nonhomotheticity.
3same across consumers with di®erent income levels. Thus, if these fractions vary, the as-
sumption of nonhomothetic preferences becomes an empirical regularity. 12
The next table presents data on average annual expenditures for consumers in the
United States across quintiles of income. These data have been constructed based on the
consumer expenditure survey 1990-1991 published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the
Department of Labor. Each column shows the fraction of total expenditures that con-
sumers belonging to a particular quintile of income spend on di®erent items. As we just
said, we use data from a single country to be clear that consumers face identical relative
prices. Transport costs and tari®s, among others, break the equalization of relative prices
across countries, which prevents us from using data for consumption shares in poor and rich
nations as an empirical base for rejecting homotheticity.
Table 1
U.S. structure of consumption, 1990
(fraction of total expenditure, quintiles)
Item 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th
Food 17.40 16.97 15.09 14.38 12.21
- at home 12.82 12.19 9.86 8.68 6.73
- away from home 4.58 4.78 5.23 5.70 5.48
Housing 36.43 32.71 30.50 29.44 29.34
Transportation 14.07 16.92 18.44 18.92 16.34
Health care 7.73 7.26 6.04 4.62 3.73
Others¤ 24.37 26.14 29.93 32.64 38.38
Source: Department of labor (1992).
(*): The category others includes items like reading,
education, tobacco and alcoholic beverages.
The table shows that these fractions do vary across quintiles of income in the United
States. For example, we can see that food represents a higher fraction of total expenditures
in lower income segments of the population than in higher income ones. This fact is even
more clear if we look at food expenditures at home. In this case, 12.82 per cent of the total
expenditures by the consumers in the lowest quintile is allocated to this item but only 6.73
per cent at the highest quintile. Evidence with respect to nonhomothetic preferences is also
provided by Ballance et al. (1985) and Crafts (1980).
The paper is organized as follows. The ¯rst section introduces the model. In section
2 we de¯ne an equilibrium and present the set of equations that characterize the solution in
our economy. Section 3 establishes a connection between patterns of trade and nonhomo-
thetic preferences. In section 4 the model is calibrated to OECD trade data, and a series
12When looking at dynamic data we observe that since the middle of the nineteenth century the evolution
of the composition of trade has been strongly a®ected by the evolution of income per capita. Manufactures as
a whole and especially certain types of manufactures in particular have increased systematically with income
per capita as shown in Bergoeing (1996). These data, however, provide weak support for nonhomotheticity
because of the changes in prices that may have occurred over time.
4of numerical experiments is performed in order to quantify the e®ect of preferences in the
evolution of trade patterns. Finally, in the last section, we present the conclusions of this
paper and discuss some extensions for future research.
1. A Standard Model of Trade with Nonhomothetic Preferences
The model presented in this section is characterized by three main features: compar-
ative advantages to explain inter-industry trade; economies of scale and taste for varieties
to account for the existence of intra-industry trade; and nonhomothetic preferences to in-
troduce income per capita levels as an explanation of trade. This model is based on the
work by Krugman (1979), Dixit and Norman (1980), Helpman and Krugman (1985) and
Markusen (1986). We will refer to it as a nonhomothetic Heckscher-Ohlin-Chamberlain
model. We will use it to account for the facts previously mentioned.
We will solve a static economy problem with a single homogeneous commodity and
a continuum of potential di®erentiated products as the only tradable commodities. We will
have a non-tradable commodity that will become relevant for both the understanding of
the e®ect of nonhomotheticity in trade patterns and the calibration exercise presented in
section 4.
The environment for this economy is described by: n countries indexed by j; three
types of commodities { di®erentiated-manufactures yj(i) for i 2 ¢ = [0;D], with the mea-
sure D ¯nite in equilibrium but in¯nitely large potentially and endogenously determined;
homogeneous-primaries x
j
0; and homogeneous-service products xj. The primaries and di®er-
entiated products are tradable but services are not;13 all consumers of a particular country
share the same utility function; identical technologies and preferences across countries;14
and two types of factors of production, labor (l) and capital (k). Each country is endowed
with lj units of labor and kj units of capital. Labor is not equally productive across coun-
tries however. Let hj be a productivity equivalent parameter such that lj bodies are equal
to hjlj = l
j e®ective units of labor in country j.
Next, we introduce the consumer's problem, ¯rms' problems, and feasibility condi-
tions that characterize the equilibrium.
1.1 Consumer's Problem














13In what follows we will refer to x
j
0 and xj as the consumption of the homogeneous and non-tradable
good, respectively.
14See Stigler and Becker (1977) who argue that \tastes neither change capriciously nor di®er importantly
between people".
15Klein and Rubin (1948) ¯rst introduced the linear expenditure system.
5subject to the budget constraint
Z
i2¢w qj(i)yj(i) di +p0x
j
0 +pjxj = rjkj +wjhj: (2)
x
j
0, xj, and yj(i) are the consumption of each individual in country j for each type of
commodity and for each i. Consumers' preferences for di®erentiated products extend over
an in¯nite set of products which we index by [0,1). Only a subset of these varieties is
available for consumption, however. ¢w = [0;Dw] represents the set of varieties available
in the market. Dw is the measure of di®erentiated products produced. The constant ¾ is a
requirement for minimum consumption and will represent the degree of nonhomotheticity.
We will impose the restriction that the production of the homogeneous good be bigger than
¾l, i.e., that the homogeneous sector is productive enough to provide the subsistence level
of the homogeneous good to all consumers.16 It is also imposed that all consumers have
enough income to purchase more than ¾ units of x
j
0. Notice that the assumption of nonho-
mothetic preferences, together with the existence of di®erences in labor productivity across
countries, results in the equilibrium being dependent on both the endowment of e®ective
units of labor and the size of the population. If the population is doubled but the produc-
tivity of labor is cut in half, the equilibrium changes. If preferences where homothetic, the
equilibrium outcome would be una®ected.
The variables p0, qj(i) and pj are the prices of the homogeneous, di®erentiated and
non-tradable commodities, respectively. The rental price of capital is rj, and wj is the
rental price of labor services. Finally, because of the assumption of free trade, the prices
of the tradable homogeneous commodities are equalized across countries. Each variety, as
we will see later, will be produced in only one place, and when factor prices are equalized,
they will be sold at the same price.
Each individual is assumed to be endowed with one unit of labor. Therefore, the
individuals have hj units of e®ective labor.
This utility function has a Cobb-Douglas structure at the inter-industry level, i.e.,
unit elasticity of substitution between di®erentiated products and the homogeneous com-
modity, and a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) structure at the intra-industry level,
i.e., among di®erent varieties of di®erentiated products. The elasticity of substitution be-
tween any two pairs of varieties is ¯nite and represented by ² = 1=(1 ¡½). We impose ½ to
be between 0 and 1. ½ < 1 (² ¯nite and positive), guarantees that the product varieties are
imperfect substitutes (this assumption is known in the literature as \love for variety".17)
We also assume ½ > 0 (² > 1), because with the Cobb-Douglas speci¯cation, the elasticity
of substitution between x0 and any i 2 ¢ is one. Thus, we impose that the di®erentiated
16With trade, ¾l
k can be larger than the production of the homogeneous good in country k but it is still
restricted by the world production.
17This assumption captures the notion that each variety is value per se. For example, if a measure D of
varieties is available to consumers and each variety has the same price qi with the varieties not produced
with an in¯nite price, consumers will consume all varieties in the same amount. Then, the sub-utility derived
from their consumption is given by D
(1¡½)=½E(i)=qi with E(i) denoting the expenditure level allocated to
di®erentiated products. Therefore, for a given level of spending and price for di®erentiated products, utility
level increases as the \number" of varieties expands.
6products be closer substitutes among themselves than with the homogeneous product. We
also assume that 0 < ® + ¯ < 1, so that the utility function is concave.
We use a Klein-Rubin utility function to introduce nonhomothetic preferences.
Thus, consumption patterns are dependent on income per capita.18 If ¾ = 0, we have
a standard homothetic utility. If ¾ 6= 0, the income elasticities of demand are not equal
to one anymore. The homogeneous commodity has an elasticity lower than one and the
other two types of commodities have elasticities greater than one. In this case, as incomes
per capita di®er across countries, so also do patterns of consumption. Richer countries will
spend as higher fraction of their income in di®erentiated products and non-tradable and a
lower fraction of their income in the homogeneous product than poorer countries.
The imposition of a minimum consumption requirement only on the homogeneous
good has an empirical justi¯cation, since the consumption of di®erentiated products and
the non-tradable good { interpreted as manufactures and services, respectively { increases
more than proportionally with growth.
1.2 Firms' Problem
Firms solve the following problems:
1.2.1 Homogeneous Product (perfectly competitive)














1.2.2 Non-tradable product (perfectly competitive)







18Another way of introducing consumption patterns dependent on income per capita levels is to follow
Lancaster (1979) where goods embody varying combinations of high-income and low-income characteristics,
then one would expect countries to have preferences more weighted towards the goods with characteristics
according with their income level.
7Perfect competition and constant returns to scale technologies imply from Euler
that both pro¯ts ¦0 and ¦j are equal to zero in equilibrium.
1.2.3 Di®erentiated Products (monopolistically competitive)
A typical ¯rm in the di®erentiated product sector maximizes, for each variety,













Furthermore, the sector is characterized by the existence of free entry.
Equation (8) is the inverse demand function. yw(i) is the world demand for variety
i faced by the producer. The parameter lf represents a ¯xed cost to production that is ex-
pressed in e®ective units of labor. With this ¯xed cost, average cost is decreasing and ¯rms
face internal economies of scale. These economies of scale are small, so that the industry
can accommodate many producers. We assume that ¯rms can costlessly di®erentiate their
products. The equilibrium in this sector is assumed to take the form of Chamberlainian mo-
nopolistic competition, where each ¯rm has some monopoly power but due to the existence
of free entry, monopoly pro¯ts are zero. 19 Because we assume that the potential range of
varieties is a continuum, oligopolistic interaction is negligible. Because of the existence of
a ¯xed cost and ¯nite endowments, however, only a ¯nite measure subset of the range will
be produced in equilibrium. Thus, the measure of varieties produced is endogeneized by
assuming free entry to the industry. Because new products can be created without cost, and
producers can do better by doing so than by sharing the market with an existent producer,
each variety is going to be produced in equilibrium by a single producer. Finally, since
we assume that each variety is produced with the same technology, while consumers value
them symmetrically and there is free movement of factors across sectors, in each country,
each di®erentiated product is produced in the same amount and sold at the same price in
equilibrium. Later, when the model is solved with factor price equalization, the previous
result will be extended to all producers of di®erentiated products, independent of the coun-
try where they operate.
From (9) we see that a variety is produced only if there is enough labor to cover the
¯xed cost lf.
19As in Chamberlain (1933), every ¯rm chooses a variety and its pricing as to maximize pro¯ts, taking as
given the variety choice and pricing strategy of the other producers in the industry.
81.3 Feasibility
In what follows, we present the feasibility conditions for the homogeneous, non-
tradable, and di®erentiated commodities, andfor labor and capital. Capital letters represent
























t(i)¡ lf;0g)1¡Ã each i 2 ¢w: (12)
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kj(i)di = kj at each j: (14)
Each di®erentiated product is produced by only one ¯rm so that in (12) the total
production of each i is strictly positive only for some j. Moreover, in (13) and (14) l
j(i)
and kj(i) are positive only for the products that are produced in the country.
Since, in each country, each variety is going to be produced in the same amount, R
i2¢j kj(i)di = Djkj(i).
2. Equilibrium: De¯nition and Solution
In this section we de¯ne an equilibrium for this economy and present the set of
equations used for solving numerically this equilibrium.
2.1 De¯nition of the Equilibrium








kj], a set of goods prices [p0;qj(i);pj], a set of rental factor prices [wj;rj] and a measure of
di®erentiated products Dj, for all i 2 ¢w and for each j, such that, given goods prices and
rental factor prices:
1. The consumer's problem is solved,
2. The ¯rms' problem are solved, and
93. Feasibility conditions are satis¯ed.
2.2 Equilibrium Solution
We will present the unknowns and equations that characterize a free trade interior
equilibrium in this economy.
The unknowns are (j and k index countries):
x
j
0 demand function for the homogeneous good,
yj(i) demand function for variety i, i 2 ¢w,
xj demand function for the non-tradable good j,
rj rental price of capital,
wj price of the e®ective labor service,
p0 price of the homogeneous good,
qj(i) price of variety i, i 2 ¢w,
pj price of the non-tradable good,
Dj varieties produced at j,
Dw varieties produced in the world.
k
j








Since the demand functions are homogeneous of degree zero, we normalize prices so
that a certain price index remains constant. Let, therefore, normalize prices according to
the { based on consumption weights { price index ¯p0 + ®q
j
i + (1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯)pj for some j.
All prices, therefore, are expressed in terms of this index and wages, for example, are real
wages. This index is country-independent when factor prices are equalized.
Because there is free trade and symmetry in preferences and technologies for di®er-
entiated products we have that qj(i) = q
j





i; Qj(i) = Q
j
i and yj(i) = y
j
i
at each j and for all i produced at j { in a two-region world (j=1,2) as the one we will use
for the calibration, we would have 36 unknowns.
Next, we present the equations that characterized the equilibrium solution. We will
keep the assumption that the world is divided into two regions.
In the consumer's problem the utility function is the composition of concave func-
tions and therefore it is also concave. The constraint is linear, so that necessary ¯rst order
conditions are also su±cient for a maximum. The continuity of the utility function together
with the compactness of the constraint su±ces for the existence of a maximum.





















where Mj ´ rjkj + wjl
j. Furthermore, because there are no trade distortions, the price of
the homogeneous tradable commodity is equalized after trade and as we will see later, when
factor prices are equalized, the prices of all varieties are also equalized across countries with
trade. Since individual demand functions are linear in income, we can aggregate them so
that, for example, X
j
0 is the aggregate demand function for the homogeneous commodity
at country j.
This solution is obtained by using a two-stage method. Since preferences are linear,
homogeneous, and weakly separable, the consumer's problem is solved by ¯rst maximizing
utility given total spending so that the share of income spent for each type of good is
obtained. Then, given the level of income left after consuming the homogeneous and non-
tradable commodities, the consumer chooses the amount spent on varieties.
From the minimization of pro¯ts at the two competitive sectors in each country:










wj = pjµ(1 ¡ º)kº
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Notice that w is the price per unit of e®ective labor l, and w is the price per unit
of bodies l; and since one unit of l provides h productivity equivalent units of service, 1=h
units of l provide one productivity equivalent unit of service priced at w = w=h.
In the di®erentiated products sector, we know that each variety is produced in the
same amount and sold at the same price, within each country. The amount of labor and















where, given the technology, only one (at each country) is independent.
Then, the cost function for an individual variety produced in the di®erentiated sector







K = (1 ¡Ã)Ã¡1Ã¡Ã:
This cost function is characterized by constant marginal cost and decreasing average
cost.
Because ¯rms face internal economies of scale, marginal cost pricing generates losses.
In this structure, the equilibrium price for a single variety is given by q
j
i(1 + 1=´) = MCj,
where ´ is the price elasticity of demand faced by the ¯rm that produces variety i and MC
j
i







From equation (17), the demand function for a single variety in country j, we can
obtain the elasticity of demand ´. Since we have a continuum of producers of di®erentiated
products, each ¯rm's pricing policy will have a negligible e®ect on the marginal utility of
income. In other words, we assume that each ¯rm in the di®erentiated product sector
considers the expenditure level in the sector to be independent of its actions. In that case,
the elasticity of demand facing each single producer of country j is given by






Thus, as long as ¢w is of positive measure, the price elasticity of demand for variety



















Furthermore, we know that the measure of varieties produced in the world must





















i; k = 1;2 (27)
In each country,


















































Finally, from the price index,
¯p0 + ®q
j
i + (1 ¡ ® ¡ ¯)pj = 1: (34)
Equations (15) through (24) and (27) through (33) hold for each country j. There-
fore, in a two region world, we have 34 equations; including equations (25), (26), and (34)
we have a total of 37 equations.20 After dropping one equation according to Walras's law,
we ¯nish with 36 equations and 36 unknowns.
We will calibrate a version of the model that is consistent with an equilibrium with









i = qi and y
j
i = yi = ®(Mj ¡¾ljp0)=(Dwqi), for all j.
Finally, notice that when factor prices are equalized, we can determine the measure
of varieties produced in the world from the feasibility condition for the di®erentiated prod-
ucts. As we said before, since we are taking the product space to be continuous, we ignore







(1 ¡ ½)®(Mw ¡ ¾lwp0)
wlf
:
We can see that in this type of economy the production level of each variety is not
a®ected by the size of the economy: only the number of varieties changes. In other words
each variety is produced in a ¯xed amount. This result depends on the fact that the mar-
ginal cost is constant.
When factor prices are equalized, we also have that, because all varieties are sold at
the same price, not only within each country but also across countries, the numerator of the
aggregate demand function for varieties in any country is given by q(n)² R
n2¢w q(n)1¡²dn =
Dwq(n). Furthermore, in this case, the zero pro¯t condition in the non-tradable sector
20One of the regions is the sum of identical countries, as we saw when looking at the total unknowns, and
we can solve for its equilibrium by calculating typical allocations as if it were only one country.
14implies that the prices of non-tradable goods are equalized across countries.21
Therefore, a solution to the interior free trade equilibrium follows from combining
the demand functions found after solving the consumerÄ is problem, the rental price of capital
and labor from solving the ¯rmsÄ i problem for each competitive sector; the demand func-
tions for capital and labor from the solution to the producer's problem in the di®erentiated
product sector; the equation for the number of varieties produced in the world; and the
feasibility conditions in the commodity and factor markets.
The solution in this economy is characterized by both inter-industry and intra-
industry trade. Di®erences in relative endowments are the source of comparative advantages
and determine patterns of trade involving the exchange of the homogeneous good for
varieties. Increasing returns to scale determine the e±cient scale of production in the
di®erentiated products sector; together with love for variety, this will induce countries to
specialize and hence creates incentives for trade of di®erent varieties.
Next, we describe the pattern of trade for thgis economy. Assuming that the world
is divided in two regions, the OECD (OE) and the rest of the world (RW); the OECD is
sub-divided in two identical sub-regions; the OECD has a comparative advantage in the
production of varieties { with two factors and two tradable type of goods, this is su±cient
for the RW to have a comparative advantage in the production of the homogeneous tradable
good; and ¯nally, imposing that varieties be produced everywhere, the apttern of trade for
this economy is as follows: intra-industry trade, de¯ned as the exchange of varieties that is
identically matched in both directions, is given by
INTRA OE ¡ RW = 2qiDrwyoe
i :
This is the case because intra-industry trade can be de¯ned as two times the min-
imum between both countries' exports, and since we have imposed a structure that is




In words, total exports of varieties from the RW to the OECD are smaller than the
ones from the OECD to the RW.
Inter-industry trade is given by
INTER OE ¡ RW = 2(Qrw
0 ¡ Xrw
0 );
and total trade between them is given by
21From zero pro¯ts in the non-tradable sector, the ratio of labor to capital used is the same across countries
if factor prices are equalized. Therefore, from the equilibrium condition for labor at any two countries, non-
tradable commodity prices must be equalized.
15TOT OE ¡RW = INTRA OE ¡RW + INTER OE ¡ RW:
Finally, total world trade is the sum of TOT OE-RM and intra-industry trade
between22 the two OECD sub-regions given by,





We have described the pattern of trade for our economy when factor prices are
equalized across countries. In what follows, we prove that factor price equalization holds.
2.3 Proof of Factor Price Equalization
We will calibrate the modelfor a free trade equilibrium withfactorprice equalization.23
In what follows, therefore, we present a proof of factor price equalization for the set of al-
locations and prices consistent with no specialization.24 This equalization of factor prices
is in terms of productivity equivalent labor.
Factor Price Equalization: In the model economy previously introduced, assume no
specialization at the industry level, then: wj = w and rj = r for all j.
Proof:
Step 1: qj(i) = q
j
i for all i 2 ¢j, at each j.
We previously mentioned that since factors can move freely across sectors within












Step 2: qj = qi for all j.
If not, assume there exist two countries A and B such that qA
i > qB
i . Because we
have assumed free entry, ¦
j
i(wj;rj) = 0 for all j. But, since we have free trade and varieties
can be created at zero cost,
22Since the two sub-regions are identical, they only engage in trade of varieties with each other.
23The rental price of capital and the price of e®ective units of labor services will be equalized after trade.
24Dixit and Norman (1980) present a proof of factor price equalization for the general case of m commodi-
ties and n factors in a homothetic version of the model previously presented. Their proof follows the method
of the integrated world economy. In general, the applicability of factor price equalization depends on the
relative number of tradable commodities and factors, but where what is relevant is not the total number of
distinguishable tradable commodities but the number of industries.
16¦A
i (wB;rB) > ¦A
i (wA;rA) = 0:
Step 3: Factor prices are completely determined by tradable commodity prices.




i (rj;wj) forall j:
Therefore, rj = r¤(p0;qi) and wj = w¤(p0;qi) for all j.
3. Volumes of Trade and Nonhomothetic Preferences
Most of the models of trade assume that preferences are identical and homothetic
across countries. This assumption implies that patterns of trade are completely determined
by the production side of the model. In the data, however, budget shares are not identical
across income levels. As we saw in Table 1, the poorer consumers are, the higher the frac-
tion of income they spend on food.
The model we presented previously is characterized by nonhomothetic preferences.
The consumption of either di®erentiated products or the non-tradable good, relative to
the tradable homogeneous good, increases with the level of income. Thus, as countries get
richer, their consumption of the high income elasticity goods as a fraction of income rises.
We are concerned with the e®ect of nonhomotheticity on trade, but as we will see
later, the understanding of its e®ect on inter-industry trade { the exchange of varieties for
the tradable homogeneous good { is su±cient for understanding the e®ects on intra-industry
trade. Therefore, we will concentrate on the former, i.e., we will consider the di®erentiated
products sector as a whole and look only at trade based on comparative advantages.
Next, we incorporate the analysis of preferences by Leamer (1984) with the exis-
tence of a non-tradable sector. Now, both production and demand a®ect the trade vector.
The non-tradable sector will also have an e®ect on inter-industry trade if preferences are
nonhomothetic. If preferences were homothetic, however, Leamer's ¯nding (1984) of no
e®ect in trade by a non-tradable sector holds.
In order to have income dependent consumption, we can represent the aggregate
consumption vector of a particular country by
X = Bl + CM;
where l is the endowment of labor (bodies) or population, M is aggregate income expen-
diture and B and C are constants. The solution to our model gives us aggregate demand
17functions of this form.25
From equations (15), (16) and (17), when factor prices are equalized, we have the





















i is the aggregate level of consumption at the di®erentiated products
sector.
In what follows, since we will focus on a single country, we omit the supra-index j.
The feasibility conditions for factors of production are:
ak0(w;r)Q0 + DwAki(w;r;Qi) + akj(w;r)Qj = k;
al0(w;r)Q0 +DwAli(w;r;Qi) + alj(w;r)Qj = l;
with avt(w;r) = @ct(w;r)=@v for v = l;k and t = 0;j being the demand for factor v per
unit of output in industry t and where ct(w;r) = Ct(w;r;Qt)=Qt is the unit cost function
for commodity t, and with Avt(w;r;Qi) = @Ci(w;r;Qi)=@v for v = l;k being the demand
for factor v by a representative producer in the manufacturing sector.
Then, let avt(w;r;Qi) ´ Avt(w;r;Qi)=Qi and Qi = QI=D, where QI is the level of output
of the manufacturing sector.
The feasibility conditions can be expressed as:
ak0(w;r)Q0 + aki(w;r;Qi)QI = k ¡ akj(w;r)Qj; and
al0(w;r)Q0 + ali(w;r;Qi)QI = l ¡alj(w;r)Qj:
In matrix form, we have
25This is referred in the literature as a linear expenditure system.
18V ¡AjQj = AQ;
where A and Aj are the 2x2 and 2x1 matrices of unit factor requirements for the production
of the tradable commodities and the non-tradable good, respectively, Q is the 2x1 vector of
production, Qj is the production level for the non-tradable good, and V is the 2x1 vector
of endowments.
The trade vector is given by:
T = Q ¡X = A¡1V ¡ A¡1AjQj ¡Bl ¡ CM:
From X = Bl + CQ we can get:
Xw = Blw +CQw = Qw = A¡1(V w ¡AjQjw)



































































pj (l ¡ slw) 1
ak0ali¡al0aki .
Therefore, if a low income per capita country is relatively scarce in e®ective labor


















This ¯nal expression for the trade vectors tells us that the pattern of trade for each
country is driven by three forces. First, we have the familiar Heckscher-Ohlin result that
a country tends to export the commodity that is intensively produced with its relatively
abundant factor. Second, countries that are relatively abundant in numbers of people tend
to import the low income elasticity good.26 Therefore, if the OECD has a comparative ad-
vantage in the production of di®erentiated products and these products have a high income
elasticity of demand, the model predicts that they will tend to export this type of good
from the production side of the model and to import them from the demand side, since
the OECD countries have a higher income per capita than the RW.27 Therefore, the usual
Heckscher-Ohlin patterns of trade are moderated, and for strong enough nonhomotheticity,
could even be reverted. In other words, under our assumptions, nonhomotheticity reduces
the level of inter-industry trade relative to the standard homothetic model. Third, depend-
ing on the technology for producing the non-tradable commodity, heckscher-Ohlin trade
may either be bolstered or reduced.
Looking at the non-tradable sector in more detail, we see that the non-tradable
sector can have three di®erent e®ects on trade patterns, depending on the relative factor in-
tensity of its technology relative to the other sectors of the economy. First, if it is intensively
produced with the abundant factor, relative to the exported good, the Heckscher-Ohlin pat-
tern is reinforced. Second, if it is intensively produced with the scarce factor, relative to
the imported good the preference pattern is reinforced.28 Finally, if it is intensively pro-
duced with the scarce factor relative to the export sector { but not relative to the import
substitution sector { the tendency is to export both goods.
Notice that these results depend on the assumption that preferences are nonhomo-
thetic. If they were homothetic, the second and third terms in the trade vector would drop
26Notice that a country can be abundant in productivity equivalent labor but still be scarce in numbers
of people if workers are su±ciently productive.
27Bergoeing (1996) provides evidence that supports the assumption of OECD countries having a com-
parative advantage in the production of di®erentiated products. Furthermore, Hufbauer (1970) found that
developed countries tend to export products that are di®erentiated.
28As before, if the non-tradable good is intensively produced with the scarce factor relative to the import
substitution sector, it must also be with respect to the export good, since this sector is intensively produced
with the abundant factor.
20out, and neither relative income per capita nor the existence of non-tradable commodities
would have any e®ect on the prediction for inter-industry trade.
Total exports in this model are determined by two main features. First, as reported
by Dixit and Norman (1980), the Heckscher-Ohlin part of the model that generates inter-
industry trade implies that total exports depend on the di®erence in relative endowments
across countries. Relative country size does not have any e®ect on the amount of exports.
The monopolistic competitive sector generates intra-industry trade, and the total amount
of exports associated with it is sensitive to reallocation of resources that bring more equal-
ity in relative country sizes. As two countries become closer in terms of size, the value
of trade between them, measured as total exports, increases. Furthermore, if resources
are reallocated so that the production of di®erentiated products increases, keeping total
product constant, total exports increase again, since a world with di®erentiated products is
more specialized than one with constant returns to scale, and therefore, it is characterized
by a larger fraction of product being traded among countries. Nonhomotheticity a®ects
intra-industry trade analogously to inter-industry trade, i.e., by changing the consumption
patterns. Since the poor country reduces its consumption share of di®erentiated products,
it reduces its tendency to import them, and since the rich country increases its consump-
tion share, it reduces its tendency to export them. Therefore, since intra-industry trade
is de¯ned as identically matched trade, it must decrease. This result, obviously, would
be reversed if we had assumed that the rich country has a comparative advantage in the
production of the low income elasticity good.
If we study the evolution of trade as a fraction of income in a homothetic economy,
income per capita levels do not play any role. When nonhomothetic preferences are intro-
duced, a positive association arises between the level of the distribution of income per capita
and total trade. Not only is the direction of trade a®ected by nonhomothetic preferences,
but so also is the magnitude of the changes that relative endowments and sizes cause in the
share of trade in product.
We have seen that nonhomotheticity can improve the ability of a standard ho-
mothetic trade model in explaining the previously reported trade facts. Speci¯cally, the
reduction (increase) in the tendency of poor (rich) countries to import di®erentiated prod-
ucts is consistent with the concentration of manufacturing trade among developed countries
and the reduction in the share of primary products in total trade observed during the last
four decades. Furthermore, the increase in the share of developed countries' trade over
product results from the fact that intra-industry trade is more specialized than compara-
tive advantage based trade, and therefore, with the increase in the former, larger fractions
of product are traded. But how important are nonhomothetic preferences quantitatively?
The main goal of the next section is to provide an answer to this question by calibrating our
model and measuring the e®ect of preferences on trade patterns during the last 30 years.
4. Calibration and Simulations
In this section we calibrate and simulate our economy by changing endowments to
be consistent with income per capita growth during the last thirty years. Our main goal is
to quantify the e®ect of preferences on trade patterns.
214.1 Calibration
We will calibrate to the OECD for 1982.29 We will have two regions: the OECD and
the rest of the world (RW). We use the OECD, National Accounts, Detailed Tables, volume
II. The data are available per country and in local currency. From the data on GDP in
U.S. dollars and local currency, we obtain exchange rates that are used to express all data
in U.S. dollars. Then, we generate the OECD data base by aggregating the country-speci¯c
data for all members but Yugoslavia. Data on trade between OECD countries and the rest
of the world is obtained from the OECD, Foreign Trade by Commodities, volumes I and II.
The goal of the exercise is to match the trade facts for the OECD in 1982. In
particular, we look at total trade between OECD and the RW (t oe-rw); inter-industry and
intra-industry trade between the OECD and the RW (inter oe-rw and intra oe-rw);30 and
total trade among the OECD countries (t oe-oe.)31
Parameters:In what follows we present a list of the parameters and endowments we must
calibrate:
from preferences: ®; ¯; ¾; ½
from technologies: °; Ã; º; lf; µ0; µi; µ




Calibration: To calibrate, we choose one unit of a good to be worth one million 1982 U.S.
dollars. This choice of units is implicit in the data we are using. We can then calibrate by
setting all prices equal to 1 in the benchmark equilibrium.
The parameter hrow is obtained from the United States Labor Statistics Bureau,
1989, by looking at the ratio of average hourly compensation between the United States
and Mexico for 1982. We found that hrow = :3;hoecd is taken to be 1.
Endowments are calculatedfrom factor compensationand operating surpluses. Since
we have factor prices equal to one, the endowment of labor can be obtained from the share
of GDP that is allocated to labor. We calculated that share to be the compensation to em-
ployees plus one half of net indirect taxes plus pro¯ts from unincorporated enterprises. The
category pro¯ts from unincorporated enterprises is added to compensation for employees in
order to capture the fact that, especially in poor countries, the operating surplus of these
enterprises primarily includes labor income. The capital endowment is computed as total
GDP minus the labor endowment. As we will see later, we get the allocation of workers
and capital across sectors analogously.
The data will show that OECD countries are labor abundant and that the homo-
geneous sector is capital intensive. Labor must be interpreted as productivity equivalent
29The benchmark year was chosen based on data availability.
30The value of exports of manufactures between the OECD and the RW that is exactly matched in both
directions will be referred as intra-industry trade between them. This de¯nition, however, considers total
manufactures, i.e., SITC classi¯cation at the one digit level and is intended for references purposes only.
31This trade is only of the intra-industry type since the two sub-regions are identical.
22labor. This is consistent with Leontief's claim that the United States was abundant in
productivity equivalent labor with respect to the rest of the world in the 1950s.32
Next we classify production, sectoral factor allocation, and consumption.
Production classi¯cation:
Q0 is agriculture, hunting, forestry and ¯shing, mining and quarrying
Qi is manufacturing
Qj is others (electricity, construction, transport and services, among others)
Notice that from the data we get total production of manufactures, which in our
model is equal to the production of a typical variety times the number of varieties produced,
but we do not see either the number of varieties produced nor the production of an individual
variety.
Factor allocation:
As with endowments, we get the allocation of labor across sectors from sectoral
labor compensation adjusted by net taxes and pro¯ts of unincorporated enterprises, and
the allocation of capital as the residual from the sector's production level. Again, for the
di®erentiated products sector, we only see the total factor allocation, i.e., both the number
of varieties produced and the amount of factors used for the production of a single variety are
not observable. Furthermore, we do not know the fraction of total labor that corresponds
to either variable labor or the ¯xed cost.
Consumption classi¯cation:
We classi¯ed production according to the classi¯cation of GDP by kind of economic
activity. For consumption, we will calibrate its value so that production and consumption













intra oe ¡ rw
2
; and
Xj = Qj for j = oe and rw:
By doing this, consumption and production satisfy the budget constraints and the
feasibility conditions and are consistent with the trade facts.
32See Leontief (1953). Tre°er (1993) also provides evidence of the abundance of the United States in
productivity equivalent labor in the 1980s.
23Next, we can calibrate the parameters of our model.
To get the constant shares and ¾ from the Cobb-Douglas utility function, we use
the demand functions (equations 15, 16 and 17). But only two of them are independent.









To get the shares of factors in the production of the homogeneous and non-tradable













Then by looking at production and factor allocations we get the technological pa-

















We have left Ã;lf;µd (from the di®erentiated products' sector) and ½ (from prefer-
ences).
From Morrison (1990), we get an estimate for the markup ratio, de¯ned as the price
of a typical variety over its marginal cost. From equation (23) we see that the markup ratio
is equal to the inverse of ½.
Next, we solve for the total ¯xed cost (Doelf) so that the zero pro¯t function is
satis¯ed { equation (24). Therefore,
Doelf = DoeQi(1 ¡½):
24Since we have expressed the ¯xed cost in terms of labor, we know that the OECD's
total allocation of labor in the manufacturing sector is given by Doelti = Doe(li+lf). Since
the number of varieties produced is not observable, we do not know the ¯xed cost of a
speci¯c variety. We set, therefore, lf such that lti is normalized to 1. Then, the number of





Then, we get Ã from the demand functions for labor and capital by a single producer





















Finally, we need to match the RW factor allocations with the trade facts. By
looking at total, intra-industry and inter-industry trade, and since we have normalized total
e®ective labor to be 1, we know the number of varieties for the OECD and the RW, the
production of a typical individual variety, and its consumption in each region. Speci¯cally,
from total e®ective labor (lti) in the di®erentiated sector we have Doe. Then, we obtain the





and with Doe known, we can get the measure of varieties produced in the world, Dw, the
consumption of a typical variety in the RW, Y rw















The measure of varieties produced in the RW, Drw, is the residual of the measure
for the world minus the measure for the OECD.
Finally, we calibrate the endowments for the RW so that they are consistent with
the measures of varieties for the world and each region. Endowments in millions of dollars
across regions from the data and calibration are as follows: koecd is 1,994,453 and l
oecd is
5,798,614 when both ¾ 6= 0 and ¾ = 0; and krw is 676,814 and 586,620 and l
rw is 1,417,072
and 1,340,026, when ¾ 6= 0 and ¾ = 0 respectively. We see from these endowments that the
OECD is relatively abundant in e®ective labor relative to the RW.
Thus, we have calibrated the parameters, OECD consumption and endowments for
the RW so that the benchmark equilibrium is reproduced and the trade facts are matched.
The calibrated parameters for both the nonhomothetic and homothetic versions of
the model are presented in Table 2.
Table 2















We have calibrated our economy in order to achieve two main goals: ¯rst, to use
the model to simulate trade patterns during the last 30 years in order to know how much
of the increase in trade between developed countries as a fraction of their income can be
accounted for by nonhomothetic preferences; and more generally, to understand better the
e®ect of nonhomothetic preferences on trade. By having a calibrated general equilibrium
model, we can experiment with di®erent exercises that can provide insight with respect to
26the e®ect of preferences on the model.
By quantifying the increase in trade predicted by our model when incomes per capita
grow, we do not expect to account for all trade changes during the period under study. Our
model only considers di®erences in relative endowments, economies of scale and nonhomo-
thetic preferences. Clearly other factors { such as seasonal trade, trade restrictions, border
trade, cultural di®erences and policy, among others { can have a signi¯cant e®ect on trade.
This latter category of trade determinants will not be addressed directly in this research,
but by quantifying the e®ects of endowments, scale economies, and nonhomotheticity, we
can see whether other issues are quantitatively important.
4.2 Quanti¯cation of the Trade Facts and Other Results
In this section we will simulate the calibrated economy. The numerical solution to
each simulation is obtained by using a globally convergent root ¯nding method based on
Newtwon.
We will measure the e®ect of preferences in trade. First, we will simulate the growth
of income per capita that both the OECD and the RW experienced since 1965 and we will
examine the evolution of the ratio of trade to income, directions and composition of trade;33
then, we will adjust the endowments in both regions according to the data minimum growth
rate of capital and e®ective labor, i.e., since capital per capita grew in 1990 3.8 per cent and
2.1 per cent in the OECD and RW, respectively, we will increase the capital endowment
of both regions by 2.1 per cent. The endowment of e®ective labor will be adjusted analo-
gously. In this way, we will look at the e®ect of nonhomotheticity for giving comparative
advantages.
As we just said, we will ¯rst adjust the yearly endowment of capital and e®ective
labor to match the change in income per capita that both the OECD and the RW experi-
enced from 1965 to 1990. We use data on non-residential capital stock per worker { that we
express in per capita terms { and on income per capita growth from Summers, Heston, Aten
and Nuxoll (1995).34 The growth rate of capital per capita is used to adjust each region's
yearly capital endowment. In order to match the growth of incomes per capita, we assume
that all technological progress adopts the form of increases in labor productivity, i.e., in hoe
and hrw, and therefore, we adjust e®ective labor per capita per region accordingly. Thus,
we change each region's yearly per capita endowment of capital and e®ective labor and then
we look at the model's predictions with respect to trade. The e®ect of nonhomothetic pref-
erences is captured by simulating both, the calibrated model with ¾ 6= 0 (nonhomothetic
preferences) and ¾ = 0 (homothetic preferences).
As relative endowments change, Heckscher-Ohlin trade patterns alter; when the
OECD increases its abundance of e®ective labor relative to the RW, inter-industry trade
increases. As relative GDP changes, the exchange of varieties also changes, which can be
thought of as Chamberlainian trade. Thus, the more equal in size two countries are, the
more they trade varieties; As the RW's size increases relative to the OECD's size, intra-
industry trade between the OECD and the RW increases. Finally, as incomes per capita
331965 is the ¯rst year of capital data that we have.
34The numbers have been converted to U.S. dollars adjusting by purchasing power parity rather than by
using current exchange rates, as described by Summers and Heston (1991).
27grow, by increasing the fraction of income spent on varieties as countries get richer, nonho-
mothetic trade grows.
Table 3 shows the result of our simulations for a measure of trade to income and
of concentration of trade. We report, for di®erent years, the simulated ratios of intra-
OECD trade to product and intra-OECD trade to OECD-RW trade.35 The ¯rst and second
columns show the ¯ndings for the nonhomothetic version of the model and the third and
fourth for the homothetic version. Finally, the last two columns show the actual data values.
Table 3
Year ¾ 6= 0 ¾ = 0 Data
F1(%) F2 F1(%) F2 F1(%) F2
1965 9.86 1.16 10.53 1.08 5.13 1.01
1970 10.11 1.18 10.36 1.10 7.66 1.51
1975 9.53 1.05 9.58 1.01 9.21 1.05
1982 9.98 1.01 9.98 1.01 9.98 1.01
1990 10.16 1.15 9.91 1.13 11.29 1.59
Note: F1 is the ratio of OECD-OECD trade to income;
F2 is the ratio of OECD-OECD to OECD-RW trade.
As we noted above, 1982 represents the benchmark year. Therefore, for that year,
both the homothetic and nonhomothetic model are calibrated to match the actual data.
During the whole period under study F1 increased 120 per cent (from 5.12 per cent to
11.29 per cent) and F2 rose 57.4 per cent (from 1.01 to 1.59). The nonhomothetic version
of the model predicts a change in F1 of only 3 per cent and a reduction in F2, while the
homothetic simulated equilibrium results in a reduction in F1 and an increase of 4 per cent
in F2. The evolution of F1 in the model is the result of changes in the relative endowment













When both regions become more similar in terms of relative endowments, the share
of varieties produced in the OECD decreases. During the periods 1965-70, 1970-75 and
1982-90 this is what happened. Inter-region di®erences in the ratio of capital to e®ective
35As we said before, we divide the OECD into two identical subregions in order to generate intra-OECD
trade.
28labor were reduced. As a result, F1 when ¾ = 0 moved accordingly. When ¾ 6= 0, however,
there is a second e®ect due to the change in the level of income per capita. As it rises,
the share of income spent on varieties increases. Since income per capita increased during
each of the subperiods, F1 tended to increase too. During 1965-70 and 1982-90, the latter
e®ect compensated for the former, resulting in an increase in F1. During the 1970-75 pe-
riod, however, the OECD experienced its lowest increase in income per capita of the whole
period and the relative endowment e®ect dominated.
In summary, the nonhomothetic and homothetic versions of the model predict dif-
ferent patterns for the ratio of OECD trade to income. Overall, the model with ¾ 6= 0 does
a better job predicting the directional changes of F1 than the homogeneous demand one.
Neither one can account for the change in the data, however.
When looking at the concentration of trade among OECD countries, as measured
by F2, we ¯nd that both versions predict the same directional changes, but again, the non-
homothetic model does a better job accounting for the level change in the data. The change

















Therefore, when relative income per capita increases for the OECD, which is what
happened during the 1965-70 and 1982-90 periods, F2 will increase. For the other periods
the opposite happened. When ¾ 6= 0, the model's predictions are ampli¯ed. A nonhomo-
thetic economy predicts larger °uctuations in the ratio of intra-OECD to OECD-RW trade
than a homothetic one. In the actual data, F2 moved in the same direction, but as before,
with much more amplitude than the nonhomothetic prediction.
These results are robust in the sense that for reasonable changes in the value of the
free parameters, namely ¯;½ and hoe;hrw { the only parameters that are not endogenously
determined from the model, the predictions of the model are not signi¯cantly a®ected, as
shown by Table 4.
Table 4
Year ¯ = :5 ½ = :95 ½ = :66 hrw = :1 hrw = :5
F1 F2 F1 F2 F1 F2 F1 F2 F1 F2
1965 9.38 1.27 9.92 1.17 9.93 1.17 8.63 1.69 10.14 1.11
1970 9.94 1.29 10.27 1.21 10.24 1.2 9.42 1.49 10.31 1.16
1975 9.50 1.09 9.67 1.07 9.52 1.05 9.08 1.13 9.61 1.04
1982 9.98 1.01 9.98 1.01 9.98 1.01 9.98 1.01 9.98 1.01
1990 10.35 1.17 10.16 1.15 10.16 1.15 10.28 1.12 10.01 1.17
29¯ = :5 is consistent with a higher level of nonhomotheticity, i.e., with a higher ¾;
when ½ is .95 and .66, the markup is 5 per cent and 50 per cent respectively; ¯nally, when
hrw is .1 and .5, a unit of labor in the RW is one tenth and one half as productive as a unit
of labor in the OECD. These values for the free parameters do not cause the predictions of
the model to change signi¯cantly, as we just said.
In addition, we can look at the model's predictions with respect to the ratio of
OECD-RW trade to OECD income (F3), OECD-RW inter-industry trade to OECD income
(F4), and OECD-OECD to OECD-RW intra-industry trade (F5). Table 5 reports these
measures.
Table 5
Year ¾ 6= 0 ¾ = 0 Data
F3(%) F4(%) F5 F3(%) F4(%) F5 F3(%) F4(%) F5
1965 8.51 6.77 5.66 9.75 9.48 38.2 5.08 4.13 5.42
1970 8.56 7.27 7.87 9.39 8.41 10.5 5.09 3.83 6.09
1975 9.08 5.08 2.38 9.45 5.34 2.33 8.76 7.07 5.44
1982 9.87 7.38 4.01 9.87 7.38 4.01 9.87 7.38 4.01
1990 8.82 6.71 4.78 8.75 5.98 3.58 7.13 3.35 2.99
Note: F3 is the ratio of OECD-RW trade to OECD income; F4 is the ratio of
OECD-RW inter-industry trade to OECD income; and F5 is the ratio of
OECD-OECD to OECD-RW intra-industry trade.
To understand the e®ect of changes in endowments on relative intra-industry trade
we can look at the ratio of intra-industry trade between the OECD and the RW to the total
trade between them. This measure is known as the Gruebel and Lloyd index IIT.36 In this







Therefore, if the measure of varieties produced in the RW (OECD) increases, ceteris
paribus, the index increases (decreases). This happens because the RW produces fewer
varieties than the OECD and intra-industry trade is de¯ned as the minimum between
DoeY rw
i and DrwY oe
i . Furthermore, it can be shown that if ¾ = 0, proportional changes
in capital and e®ective labor in both regions do not a®ect this index. If ¾ 6= 0, however,
population must also change proportionally to get the same result. Finally, since trade
must be balanced, changes that increase the number of varieties produced in the OECD
and reduce inter-industry trade { like an increase in the endowment of capital in the e®ective
labor abundant OECD { will create an increase in the level of intra-industry trade between
the OECD and the RW. Since countries are relatively more similar in terms of endowments,
Heckscher-Ohlin trade decreases, but since varieties are consumed everywhere, exports from
36See Gruebel and Lloyd (1975).
30the OECD to the RW increase, and the exports of varieties from the RW to the OECD
must do so too.
Table 6 shows the simulated values for the previous trade measures when factors
were adjusted, holding comparative advantages unchanged.
Table 6
Year F1(%) F2 F3(%) F4(%) F5
1965 9.40 1.08 8.72 5.11 2.61
1970 9.65 1.05 9.19 6.07 3.08
1975 9.83 1.03 9.57 6.80 3.55
1982 9.98 1.01 9.87 7.38 4.01
1990 10.04 1.00 10.0 7.63 4.24
When preferences are homothetic, since neither relative income per capita across
regions nor the relative abundance of endowments has changed, all measures stay constant.
For ¾ 6= 0, since incomes per capita increase consistently over time, all measures change
monotonically during the period under study. Every year represents a higher level of income
per capita than the previous one and is associated, therefore, with higher trade to income
for OECD countries, smaller trade within the OECD relative to OECD-RW and higher
trade OECD-RW and intra-OECD intra-industry trade relative to OECD-RW. In this case,
the proportional change in endowments does change the relative size of countries, however.
This a®ects the ratio of intra-industry trade, as we noted above.
The model's predictions with respect to the income distribution e®ects of trade
liberalization are consistent with the conclusions that would be inferred from a pure mo-
nopolistically competitive economy. Since inter-industry trade is reduced relative to the
case with homotheticity, and since each region tends to import the good that it produces
with a comparative advantage, the real change in factor returns predicted by a Heckscher-
Ohlin economy is not so signi¯cant. This is consistent with evidence from the European
Community creation and the North American auto pact. It is important to mention, how-
ever, that the assumption of constant marginal cost, together with the CES structure in
the subutility for varieties results in an economy that is characterized by no competitive
gains when engaging in trade; i.e., any bene¯t due to trade is in the form of an increase in
varieties available for consumption. Trade does not increase the scale of production of any
variety, even though it is scale economies that are responsible for the gains from trade.
Finally, it can be noted that the nonhomothetic model's prediction with respect
to terms of trade is consistent with the evolution observed in the data. The price of the
homogeneous tradable good, p0, decreases consistently during the period under study, de-
noting the deterioration in terms of trade experienced by less developed countries since the
1930s.37
In summary, the model's prediction with respect to the evolution of trade relative
to product and the concentration of trade improves, in terms of the directional change,
37See Borensztein et al. (1994)
31when nonhomothetic preferences are assumed. How much of the data changes can be ac-
counted for by these feature? Not much, however. The data show changes in the previous
two measures of trade that are larger than the ones predicted by the model by a factor of
10 and 5 respectively. Shocks like the increase in the price of oil and the regionalization
of the world economy { especially as a result of the European Economic Community cre-
ation { may have had an e®ect in the pattern of trade that fundamentals in general { and
nonhomothetic preferences in particular { cannot account for.
5. Conclusions
Our main goal has been to measure how much of the increase in the volume and
concentration of trade seen during the post World War II period can be accounted for by
considering preferences as a \non-trivial" determinant of trade. In order to do so, we in-
troduced a model where trade is explained by di®erences in relative autarky prices { due
to country speci¯c relative endowments, economies of scale and love for variety, and non-
homothetic preferences.
The world is separated into two regions: the OECD and the RW. The OECD has
a comparative advantage in the production of manufactures and the RW in the production
of a primary product. In addition, there is a non-tradable homogeneous commodity that
is associated with non-tradables and services in the data. Manufactures take the form of
varieties in a monopolistically competitive sector and are characterized by a high income
elasticity of demand; the primary product is represented by a homogeneous good compet-
itively produced and is characterized by a low income elasticity of demand. Therefore, as
the level of income per capita grows, the consumption of manufactures as a fraction of
income increases. Since production of varieties is highly specialized, trade of manufactures
as a fraction of total trade increases. Furthermore, if income per capita for the OECD
increases relative to the RW, trade concentrates there. In fact, during the 1965-90 period
incomes per capita increased 87.7 per cent and 71.9 per cent in the OECD and the RW,
respectively. If the model were homothetic, the increase in income per capita levels would
have no e®ect on the ratio of trade to product, as long as relative endowments and size stay
unchanged across regions. Since consumption patterns are a®ected by income, however, a
homothetic model will omit this e®ect on trade patterns. Finally, when a rich country has
a comparative advantage in the production of the high income elasticity good, each coun-
try tends to import its Heckscher-Ohlin exported good. With nonhomotheticity, therefore,
inter-industry trade is reduced relative to the case with homogeneous demands. This seems
consistent with the directional changes of the post World War II trade patterns. But how
important is it quantitatively?
We simulate this economy by adjusting capital and e®ective labor in per capita terms
in both regions to match changes in income per capita, and then look at the predictions of
the model with respect to di®erent measures of trade. The calibrated model, however, is
not able to account for a substantial part of the change in trade. Neither the increase in
trade as a fraction of income nor the concentration of trade among developed countries can
be signi¯cantly accounted for by this model. In fact, while the ratio of intra-OECD trade
to OECD income increased from 5.1 per cent to 11.29 per cent during the 1965-90 period,
32the nonhomothetic version of the model predicts a change from 9.86 per cent to 10.16 per
cent. The model's predictions are more accurate during the 1975-90 period but still only
account for 6.6 per cent of the 22 per cent change observed in the data. With respect to
the concentration of trade among OECD countries, while the data shows an increase in the
ratio of intra-OECD trade to OECD-RW trade from 1.009 to 1.51 and 1.01 to 1.59 during
the 1965-70 and 1982-90 periods, respectively, the nonhomothetic model predicts changes
from 1.16 to 1.18 and 1.01 to 1.15. This model, therefore, is not able to account for the
growth in trade observed during the last 30 years.
How surprising is this? Not particularly, when we consider that the ratio of trade
to product at the end of the nineteenth century was higher than it is today. In fact, the
levels of trade and concentration among developed countries that characterized the world
during the last century have not been achieved again, even after 40 years of continuous
growth in trade. If nonhomothetic preferences were signi¯cantly driving the patterns of
trade, trade should have been much lower and less concentrated 100 years ago than it is
today. So why was trade so high and concentrated during the last century? And why has
trade increased so fast since the 1950s? Many elements seem to be important for explaining
these patterns. As we mentioned in Bergoeing (1996), for example, the Industrial Revolu-
tion and the changes in the production and consumption structure that followed did play
a key role. In addition, the evolution of trade policy seems to have been crucial. Low
restrictions during the nineteenth century { and in particular by the 1860s { may have been
fundamental for the determination of the level of trade. Since the 1950s, the reduction in
manufacturing restrictions, mainly among developed nations, and the increase in regional
trade, emphasized by the creation of the European Community, may have played a crucial
role. In fact, during the 1953-90 period, over 40 per cent of the total increase in world
exports is the result of the rise in intra-European trade alone.
Our results, however, can be a®ected by some theoretical and empirical limitations.
The model is static. It might be interesting to introduce a dynamic setting and study the
nonhomothetic transition toward a balanced growth path, allowing for capital accumulation.
Moreover, this model not only omits trade policy but also other important elements, such as
seasonal trade, border trade and cultural di®erences. Finally, the speci¯c functional forms
chosen, although simplifying the model's solution, impose restrictions on di®erent areas:
The Klein-Rubin type of function is characterized by linear consumption expansion paths.
Empirical research, however, suggests that Engel curves show curvature;38 the income elas-
ticity of the inferior good increases with income per capita introducing more sensitivity to
income per capita levels in poor countries than in rich ones. This may explain the fact
that in the model the RW tends to increase its trade of di®erentiated products more than
the OECD does; Economies of scale result from the ¯xed cost in the di®erentiated prod-
ucts sector; this cost is expressed in terms of labor. By considering a ¯xed capital cost, as
well, the importance of intra-industry trade could increase. We have assumed the existence
of only two factors of production, capital and labor. By having a third factor { land for
example { that could be sector speci¯c, decreasing returns would be emphasized. Gains
from trade take the form of increasing variety exclusively, the level of production does not
change. Finally, with respect to the assumption of the monopolistically competitive sector,
38See Yen and Roe (1989).
33few industries in the world are well described by this model. The model assumes that a
¯rm behaves as if it were a true monopoly. Instead, the most common market structure
is one of small-group oligopoly. In this setting ¯rms may engage in collusive and strategic
behavior.
With respect to the empirical analysis, problems arise as a result of the interpre-
tation of the data for the calibration. One of the most controversial features in the data
has to do with the fact that less developed countries seems to be abundant in capital and
developed countries in labor. As we saw before, however, we interpret labor as e®ective
units and as in Leontief (1953) and Tre°er (1993), we say that the OECD is abundant in
e®ective units of labor, even though the RW is abundant in people, for example.
As we just said, however, the model provides a plausible theoretical explanation of
trade patterns. In particular, this model give us some insight to understand the e®ect of
fundamentals in trade patterns. Trade of manufactures as a share of total trade has con-
sistently increased since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. Speci¯cally, as income
per capita rises, the demand for manufactured consumer goods, capital goods, and services
increases while the demand for food and clothing decreases. These changes in consumption
patterns in°uence the structure of both domestic consumption and production and a®ect
the volume, direction and composition of international trade. Moreover, trade seems to
move faster than production during episodes of stable economic environment. These facts
are consistent with the introduction of nonhomotheticity in a model of the kind presented
in this paper.
Furthermore, there is evidence that trade liberalization is less disruptive than pre-
dicted by comparative advantage based models, as we have seen with the European experi-
ence and the North American auto pact. Models of monopolistic competition are consistent
with this feature, and the introduction of nonhomotheticity moves in the same direction
since inter-industry trade { which causes factor returns to change { is reduced. It would be
interesting to quantify this e®ect; i.e., does this model improve the prediction with respect
to the income distribution e®ects of trade liberalization relative to a homothetic model with
a Heckscher-Ohlin and monopolistically competitive structure?
Summarizing, even though the theoretical implications of the model may help us to
understand the evolution in trade patterns, the model is unable to explain a substantial part
of the change in the post World War II level of trade. Restrictions and trade agreements
may be crucial to account for these patterns. Our concern should then be, how important
has policy been for the evolution of trade levels? This question seems crucial and should
receive more attention.
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